University of Mississippi

eGrove
Haskins and Sells Publications

Deloitte Collection

1956

Electronics -- A Challenge to auditors
Robert G. Wright

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_hs
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Haskins & Sells Selected Papers, 1956, p. 344-358

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Haskins and Sells Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Electronics — A Challenge to Auditors
B Y ROBERT G . WRIGHT
PRINCIPAL, CHICAGO O F F I C E

Presented before The Institute of Internal
Auditors, Atlanta Chapter — December 1956

What effect will electronic data processing have upon auditing
procedures? Will some of our customary documents and records disappear ? Should audit techniques include verification of machine programs ? Will internal control be strengthened or weakened by the transition to electronics ? In general, how much do we really have to know
about electronic data processing to do an effective job of auditing?
Answers to these and related questions are of concern to all auditors, internal or independent. The answers, of course, will be developed gradually as electronic installations become more prevalent.
However, experience to date in auditing the new systems, although
limited, provides clues to some of the ultimate answers.
INTERNAL CONTROL
Our consideration of the impact of electronic data processing will
begin with a discussion of some of the broader aspects of internal
control.
Proper evaluation of internal control is a mandatory prerequisite
to the issuance of an unqualified certificate by an independent public
accountant. Similarly, internal control is uppermost in the mind of the
internal auditor as he assists management in achieving efficient administration. Auditors, professional and corporate alike, are concerned
with the effect that electronic data processing will have on established
systems of internal control.
A fundamental characteristic of a good system of internal control
is an appropriate segregation of functional responsibiliites and duties.
On the other hand, maximum utilization of the expensive electronic
data-processing machines requires, in many instances, a so-called
"consolidated functions" approach to processing. Thus, an electronic
version of the "segregation versus integration" issue is at hand.
To illustrate, in processing a sales order, the electronic equipment might be programmed to determine the availability of stock, check
the customer's credit status, prepare necessary shipping documents,
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adjust the inventory records, issue a purchase order to replenish the
stock if the new on-hand balance is below the reorder level, prepare the
sales invoice, charge the customer's account, post the accounting distribution of the sale, and accumulate desired sales statistics. A l l of
this would be done as one processing cycle through one or more passes
of the transaction through the electronic machines. Two questions arise
under such a "consolidated functions" approach: (1) Is internal control
weakened by consolidating responsibilities previously assigned to i n dependent departments? (2) Will personnel in the data-processing
center have sufficient over-all knowledge of accounting requirements to
effect an irregularity?
Departmental segregation for internal-control purposes means
that no operating department and no asset-custodian department should
control its own accounting records. Thus, the basic functions of authorizing a transaction, recording the transaction, and maintaining
custody of resultant assets should be separated. It appears that the
several activities of the accounting department can be consolidated
under electronic processing without disturbing this separation of departmental responsibilities. However, EDP, as electronic data processing is often called, will very likely take over some of the paperwork activities of the operating and custodian departments. So long as
the activities mechanized relate to accounting or record-keeping, it
again appears that the consolidation should not weaken control.
The internal auditor is the logical person to determine that
cross-checks between departments are maintained under EDP. Data
processing may be centralized, but authorization and stewardship
should remain independent of data processing.
As an example, assume that a credit manager whose records are
maintained on magnetic tape approves an increase in the credit limits
of a particular customer. He could, of course, advise the machine
operator of his intentions and the desired change could be made by
direct keyboard modification of the master records. Obviously, this
would provide no record of the authority for the change. The internal
auditor should insist that such changes be authorized in writing. For
example, the authorization could be recorded on a punched card. After
processing, the approved card would be retained in the credit department files. Similar requirement should be provided for processing
changes in other master records that require file maintenance of this
type.
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Will personnel in the data-processing center have sufficient overall knowledge of accounting requirements to effect an irregularity?
Obviously, any person who programs a complete application will have
such knowledge. But the principle of segregation can be applied to the
duties of employees within the data-processing center. Programming,
broadly speaking, comprises system design, block diagramming, coding
of machine instructions, and testing. These activities can be segregated.
Installation of electronic equipment may increase the likelihood of
collusion among employees to defraud the organization. There will be
fewer employees involved in data processing; accordingly, fewer people
need be involved in the scheme.
How would an EDP operator, familiar with the over-all programming of an application, perpetrate an irregularity, either through collusion or through some weakness in control? Here are four possible
methods: (1) manipulation of input media; (2) manipulation of externally
stored program; (3) keyboard alteration of data stored in memory; and
(4) keyboard modification of internally stored programs.
Input media, such as punched cards or paper tape, could, in the
absence of effective controls, be altered by the machine operator. In
a file-maintenance type of application, he could alter either the transaction media or the media containing permanent or master records.
For example, in a payroll application, he could increase the number of
hours worked for a given employee or he could increase the rate of pay
contained in the master personnel file.
Machine instruction programs are usually stored on punched
cards or on magnetic tape. If the programs are altered by the operator,
the machine will become a reliable accomplice to his scheme. Similarly, transactions, master data, and instructions can be modified by the
operator during the processing of data by depressing appropriate keys
on the control console. There will be no tell-tale erasure marks to
trace alterations such as these.
Such practices must be based upon some weakness in control if
they are to be profitable to the operator. The auditor's responsibility
is to determine that such weaknesses do not exist. To fulfill this responsibility he must have an adequate knowledge of control techniques,
both mechanical and human.
Let us consider these control techniques and related auditing
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procedures under the following classifications: (1) input; (2) processing; and (3) output.
INPUT
Authenticity of Source Data
In most electronic installations, source documents, such as time
cards, vendor invoices, receiving reports, and material requisitions,
will continue to serve as the raw material for the data-processing
operations. The validity of resultant transactions will continue to be
established by the auditor by customary procedures, since approvals
and other evidence of regularity will be available in visible form.
However, an auditing problem may exist even though the required
source documents are on hand. The problem is that the documents may
not be filed in a manner that facilitates post-auditing procedures. Under so-called "off-line" or "batch" accounting methods, source documents are accumulated into batches comprising economic processing
groups. Information from the documents is transcribed to an input
medium, such as punched cards or magnetic tape, and may then be
sorted mechanically into some desired sequence. The documents, however, may not be sorted, but retained in random sequence. This problem is not new; it exists in present punched-card applications.
The problem may become more complex under so-called "in-line"
or "continuous" accounting methods. Under this new approach, transactions will be processed in random sequence immediately after they
occur. There will be no delay while enough transactions are accumulated to form an economic batch. The new concept of data processing is
made possible through the recent development of random-access memory units that can store millions of characters. Data will flow into these
systems in random order and on a continuous basis. Ledgers, files,
and other internally-stored records will be up-dated immediately, and
the status of each record will be available instantly to interested personnel through electronic interrogation. IBM's contributions to this
field are the Ramac 305 and the Ramac 650. In announcing the machines, Thomas J . Watson, J r . , President of IBM, said "Ramac equipment will not only revolutionize punched-card accounting but also magnetic-tape accounting."
Returning to our problem, it is apparent that since transactions
will be processed in random sequence as they occur, sorting of source
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documents may become an extra manual operation that some programmers will consider unnecessary. The auditor must therefore insist
that the source documents be arranged and filed in a manner that will
accommodate his verification of the results of data processing.
There is another trend under way which may cause the auditor
even more concern as to the validity of source data. This is the development of devices which may completely eliminate certain source
documents. In the retail field, so-called "point of sale" recording devices could eliminate the traditional sales slips and cash-register tapes.
In the industrial field, automatic production recorders may capture data,
without reference to visible production tickets. Time cards may disappear if employees punch in by inserting identification plates in time
clocks which automatically record the arrival data on tape or other
coded media.
Fortunately (for auditors), little progress has been made in this
direction to date. The trend is clear however. Development of devices
which eliminate source documents will pose serious new problems in
auditing techniques. New methods must be found of testing the validity
of transactions that enter the data-processing pipeline. Equipment
manufacturers will be encouraged to design their devices to produce
source documents simultaneously with the capture of data in coded
form. In some instances it may be necessary for the device or the
computer to print the transactions for auditing purposes only. Perhaps
the auditor will have to rely more heavily on observation in order to
verify the authenticity of input media.
Correctness of Input Media
What control procedures can be applied to assure accurate transcription of data from source documents to the computer's input medium? Input media today consist of punched cards, paper tape, and
magnetic tape. Behind these are such auxiliary machines as card-totape converters, punched-card reproducers and transceivers, Teletype
receivers, tape-to-card converters, and many others. However, in the
final analysis all input to electronic data-processing machines stems
from an initial typing or keyboard operation. Accordingly, emphasis
for control purposes must be placed on the typing or keyboard operations.
Control procedures for the typing or keyboard operations will
undoubtedly resemble those now used in punched-card installations.
These include manual review of document coding, key-verification of
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card punching, comparison of source documents with proof listings, and
balancing to independently determined batch totals. In one electronic
system, magnetic tape can be coded directly with a typewriter. A
separate typewriter is then used to verify the original coding.
The most effective way to assure accuracy is to eliminate unnecessary typing or keyboard operations, by mechanizing as much of
the transcription work as possible. Many new devices are available
for this purpose. Under the concept of integrated data processing,
typewriters, adding machines, cash registers, and bookkeeping machines are equipped to prepare paper tapes or punched cards as a byproduct of the preparation of an original document or record. The correctness of the coded media is established by inspecting the information
typed on the document or record. Pre-coding of documents, such as the
magnetic ink coding of checks as advocated by banks, will eliminate
subsequent keyboard operations. Scanning devices will eliminate human
transcription by reading information imprinted by Addressograph plates
and otherwise. A more common example is the use of pre-punched
cards which are prepared by reproducing verified master cards. A l l
of these devices and techniques eliminate manual transcription and
therefore increase the accuracy of computer input data.
Completeness of Input Data
One question remains regarding input. What controls are necessaryto ensure processing of all transactions that should be processed?
Again we find the answer in present controls for punched-card systems.
Source documents should be prepared by a department other than
the data-processing department. They should be retained in the originating department and filed in a sequence that will facilitate identification with related records or documents prepared by the data-processing
machines.
Batch totals or other control totals should be established by the
originating department and subsequently traced to the data-processing
results. Where such totals are inapplicable, documents or cards forwarded for processing should be controlled by pre-determined item
counts or "hash" totals. For example, one company, which maintains
a network of telephone lines for its IBM Transceivers, establishes
card-counts for data transmitted to its EDP center. Cards automatically reproduced at the center are counted for agreement with the predetermined counts. Other control techniques are apparent. For exam349

pie, source documents should be pre-numbered and the numerical sequence accounted for by the originating department.
PROCESSING
So far we have discussed various controls to establish the authenticity, correctness, and completeness of data entering an electronic
system. In general, the control techniques are carry-overs from those
found in punched-card systems and require only limited knowledge of
electronic techniques on the part of an auditor. But the responsibility
of the internal auditor does not stop short of the machine room. He
must also evaluate controls within the EDP center. He must make
certain that machine errors will be detected and that processing procedures produce the results intended.
Accuracy in electronic data processing is dependent upon two things:
Machine reliability and adequacy of human planning and control. The latter includes programmed control and equipment maintenance policies.
Machine Reliability
We can approach the matter of machine reliability with the comforting knowledge that electronic equipment as such is the most accurate tool yet developed for this purpose. The readability and storage
ability of magnetic tape has now been verified by field usage. Internally, the machines have already amassed remarkable records of errorfree performance.
Accuracy is really a matter of detecting errors. The extent of
circuitry built into the equipment for this purpose varies from one
make to another. In fact, the need for checking circuits is hotly debated
by competing machine manufacturers because each additional circuit
increases the cost of the system.
One type of an error-detection circuit is designed to check the
data at various stages as it moves from one place to another within the
equipment. It starts with parity-check bits placed on the magnetic tape
by the recording mechanism. A s the bits forming a coded character
speed through the system they pass checking stations watching for
missing bits. Error signals flash on the console unit when a character
does not make sense to the machine. Since some errors are intermittent in nature, the machine, through programming, may reread the invalid character. If the error persists, the machine, again at the option
of the programmer, will come to a sudden halt.
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Some systems employ duplicate circuitry for arithmetic computations, whereby all calculations are automatically computed twice and
compared. Other techniques used include those to detect invalid instructions, overflow conditions in an accumulator, and errors in tape
writing, card punching, and printing.
The internal auditor's responsibility is to become familiar with
the built-in controls of the particular system used in his company. He
must do this in order to know what controls should be provided through
programming.
Programmed Control
The various types of self-checking features that are built into the
machines are important to the auditor. Of equal importance is the possibility of detecting errors by so-called "program checks."
A program check is included in the machine's internally stored
instructions. For example, the machine may be told to verify the results of one operation before proceeding to the next. Opportunities for
using these checks are virtually unlimited. In some instances, the
checks are "free", in that additional machine time is either negligible
or nil. In other instances, such as when the machine does not have
enough storage capacity to store the checking instructions, verification
may require an additional pass of the transactions through the machines. Thus, the limiting factor in programming a check is really a
matter of economics — is the cost of the check proportionate to the
losses which would result if the errors are not detected?
The internal auditor's responsibility is to determine that needed
checks that can be justified economically are included in the machine
programs. Obviously, all operations need not be verified, for a surprisingly large percentage of electronically produced accounting results
can be substantiated by reference to independent data.
Here are some actual examples taken from electronic applications
currently in use by some of the clients of our F i r m :
A payroll program provides for proving the computation of the
net pay of each employee. After the original computation is
made, the deductions are added back and the new total must
equal the original gross pay.
Another payroll program provides for a duplicate accumulation
of daily earnings to develop weekly totals, for individual employees and for each department. The check is considered to be
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fool-proof and has eliminated the manual recapitulation previously done by the payroll department.
One program tests the operating accuracy of the computer immediately after each important calculation. The machine computes a programmed arithmetic exercise which should produce
a zero amount. If zero does not result, the arithmetical unit is
not functioning properly and the machine is programmed to stop.
One payroll program provides for a comparison of computed
piecework earnings with predetermined maximums. Checks of
this type are known as reasonableness tests.
Several payroll programs verify withholding tax computations on
an over-all basis, based upon an accumulation of individual
earnings and exemptions. Over-all proofs of this type are reliable and economical.
Frequently it is expedient to use standard punched-card machines
to check the work of an electronic machine. In a billing application, for
example, a summary card containing computed invoice totals may be
punched by the electronic machine. The invoices may be printed on a
standard accounting machine from header cards and detail item cards,
also punched by the electronic machine. The accounting machine could
be wired to accumulate invoice totals and, using the well-known zerobalance method, determine that the totals agree with those previously
punched into the summary card by the electronic machine.
In addition to verifying the accuracy of machine calculations,
other types of program checks are usually necessary. Through the use
of coded identification labels on each reel of magnetic tape, the machine
can be programmed to determine that the manual chore of mounting the
proper reel on the proper tape unit is performed correctly. Selfchecking circuits may detect certain machine errors. However, unless
properly programmed, the errors will not be printed out or otherwise
brought to the operator's attention. During processing it may be necessary to transfer the contents of internal memory to a "check-point"
tape so that if an error is subsequently detected the work can be backed
up to that proven point.
Programmers frequently have a tendency to ignore the use of duplicate computations and similar program checks. They have a profound respect for the inherent accuracy of electronic hardware. They
work feverishly just to develop a program that will do the required job.
Accordingly, they consider certain program checks to be extra work
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and of little or no value. Machine salesmen frequently share these
views. These attitudes merely emphasize the need for a review of machine programs by the internal auditor.
As mentioned earlier, a console operator could, through some
weakness in internal control or through collusion, introduce or modify
both data and programs in an unauthorized manner. The auditor may
suggest certain controls to minimize such activities. He might suggest
that operating responsibility be fixed by requiring that all elapsed machine time be recorded in a control register showing the names of personnel responsible. He might suggest a rotation plan for the work of
data-processing personnel. Under this plan, a console operator would
have to permanently conceal an irregularity before turning the records
over to his successor.
The auditor should also determine that provision is made for the
reconstruction of data in the event of fire or accidental mutilation.
Certain records on magnetic tape can be reconstructed from the introductory medium, such as punched cards. Here, the cards should be retained in a safe place until the possible need for reconstruction has
expired. Other tape records, such as a perpetual inventory, cannot be
reconstructed readily. In these cases, the auditor may suggest that the
tapes be prepared in duplicate.
Maintenance Policies
In addition to built-in checking circuits and programmed verification, accuracy of processing depends upon the adequacy of maintenance activities.
When an electronic system is purchased, maintenance can be
performed by customer personnel or by manufacturer's personnel on a
contract basis. When the system is leased, maintenance by the manufacturer is usually included in the rental charge.
In one installation of a large-scale electronic data-processing
system, the manufacturer has assigned a crew of six engineers to
maintain the equipment. Four of these men work from 7:30 in the
morning until 4:30 in the afternoon. The other two men work from 9:30
A M to 6:30 P M . One hour is devoted to preventive maintenance at the
beginning of each day. Problems are fed into the system which test
every possible machine command and the operating condition of tape
drives, the arithmetical unit, core memory, auxiliary drum memory,
and other units. A "high-low" voltage test is applied to detect marginal functioning of tubes and circuits. After the equipment is turned
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over to the customer, the engineers subject available units of equipment
to more comprehensive testing. Rigid schedules are followed which
provide for periodic complete inspections of all components. Thus,
some components are inspected monthly, others quarterly or annually,
according to the manufacturer's specifications.
As installations become more prevalent, it is conceivable that a
scarcity of competent engineers may force some manufacturers to
curtail certain customer maintenance programs. When customers
provide their own maintenance, it is not uncommon to find a wide deviation from the maintenance policies recommended by the manufacturer. For these reasons, the adequacy of maintenance practices
should be investigated.
A l l of this is not to imply that an internal auditor must become
and electrical engineer. However, it appears that his responsibilities
might include: determining whether preventive maintenance schedules
comply with manufacturer's recommendations; and determining whether
adequate records of errors and machine down-time are kept and analyzed by reason.
OUTPUT
Having considered some of the problems of input and processing,
let us now turn our thoughts to the output of electronic data-processing
machines.
Customary controls should be exercised over records, reports,
and documents prepared by an electronic data-processing system. In a
payroll application, for example, numerical accountability should be
kept of payroll checks, responsibility for the supply of blank checks
should be fixed, use of the signature plate should be regulated, and the
distribution of all forms and records should be controlled.
The challenging problems, so far as output is concerned, involves
information that is not printed, rather than what is printed.
Printed output is used externally by customers or other outside
groups, or it is used internally. External output, such as invoices to
customers, payroll checks, and shipping notices, may always be necessary in some printed form. But internal output, in the form of visible
records, may, in some instances, be eliminated.
Management by exception, as applied to electronic data-processing systems, means that only those items requiring human action or
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attention should be printed in report form — all other detail would remain in coded form in some storage medium or device. This is, indeed,
a challenge to auditors, for we need, or at least we think we need, our
familiar journals, intermediate works sheets, ledgers, detailed trial
balances, and the like.
We must not retard the trend toward exception reporting simply
because customary auditing procedures can not be applied. Management by exception is a useful technique. Through it, the electronic
machines can relieve management and lesser personnel of many routine
decision-making chores. Through it, the great potential usefulness of
the flexible machines can be realized. We must criticize the technique
only after we have found that it is impracticable effectively to audit the
system by any method.
We may never reach the point where an auditor must serve as a
constant watchdog, continuously assigned to the observation of input,
processing, and output of a completely automatic system. However, we
must determine our auditing requirements for each new application in
this rapidly changing field of data processing.
Under EDP, the files and permanent records of several departments may be consolidated. For example, a consolidated stock record
may be stored on magnetic tape or in a large-capacity internal storage
device. Processing of transactions would, in a single pass, up-date the
records of, say, production control, purchasing, inventory control, and
cost accounting. If the transactions are normal and the adjusted records require no human attention, the program might not provide for a
print out of an audit trail. In such cases, the auditor may be justified
in insisting upon the printing of a chronological record showing the
manner in which the transactions are processed. After all, auditing is
necessary and must be accommodated at times even though preparation
of audit media requires additional machine time.
In lieu of a continuous printing of transactions, the auditor may
find a substitute procedure. He may request that the audit trail be
written only on magnetic tape. The reels of tape could be filed for a
reasonable period of time. The auditor could then select certain reels
and have the information thereon printed for test-checking purposes.
Or, the auditor may devise a set of representative transactions for his
testing purposes. The transactions could be either real or fictitious,
with predetermined processing results. The auditor could then run
these transactions through the electronic machines and compare com355

puted results with the known results. This would enable the auditor to
pass judgment on the effectiveness of the machine's stored program.
In some instances, the policy of reporting exceptions only may
be helpful to auditors, rather than a problem. Through statistical
sampling the machine may select items for his tests. The machine
could then test these items for him, leaving a visible record for the
bulk of the transactions in comparatively short order. He could then
turn his attention to the exceptional items which are printed out and
which deserve more of the auditor's time in the first place.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS
The auditor's review of the internal control and auditing implications of an electronic application preferably should be done several
months before the new system is placed into actual operation. If his
review discloses need for additional controls, the required programming or other changes can be made more easily at this stage.
During his review, the auditor should devise a check-list for
evaluating subsequent applications. He should revise his former audit
program to give effect to changes caused by the electronic system. He
may develop scientific sampling techniques and other means of utilizing
the machine for his auditing purposes. He should arrange for special
print-outs that will be required for audit purposes at a later date.
Conversion to electronic data processing will necessitate careful
planning on the part of the auditor. For example, the auditor may wish
to confirm customers' accounts receivable as of some future date. His
preliminary review may disclose that the system does not provide for
printing periodic trial balances. He must then allow ample time for
preparation of a program which would cause the machine to print out
the trial balances as of the specified date. The trial balance will be
available only at that date because the balances will change when succeeding transactions are processed.
SUMMARY
How much do we really have to know about electronic data processing to do an effective job of auditing? This was our original question. Perhaps the answer can be developed by summarizing the points
previously mentioned.
As to the broader aspects of internal control, it appears that the
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auditor should, with no specific training in EDP, be able to determine
the adequacy of cross-checks between departments. He can determine
that the basic functions of authorizing, recording, and asset-custodianship are segregated.
On the other hand, specific training in electronic data processing
usually will be necessary if the auditor is to determine whether a proper segregation of duties exists within the data-processing department.
He must know the mechanics of altering data and machine instructions
if he is to determine the opportunities for irregularity afforded to the
operators, individually or through collusion.
Without additional training, the auditor should be able to establish
the authenticity of source documents and to determine that they are filed
in a manner that facilitates auditing. However, in the event certain
documents are discontinued as a result of automation, knowledge of
machine capabilities will be very helpful to the auditor. He could then
suggest practical means for providing an adequate audit trail.
Without additional training, the auditor should also be able to appraise the control of typing and other keyboard operations. The control
methods are designed to assure accuracy of input media and are the
same as those now used in punched-card systems. Elimination of repetitive typing through integrated data-processing techniques merely s i m plifies this control area.
Similarly, the auditor should, with no additional training, be able
to appraise the controls to ensure processing of all valid transactions.
Batch-totals, card-counts, hash-totals, prenumbering, and other techniques of documentary control are familiar procedures that will be
continued.
However, the auditor very definitely will need specific training
in order to determine that built-in error-detection devices are properly utilized.
Similarly, the auditor must understand the rudiments of programming if he is to determine which phases of an application should and can
be verified through use of program checks.
Specific knowledge will also be necessary in order for the auditor
to determine whether provision is made for reconstructing data in the
event of fire or mutilation.
The auditor's review of maintenance policies will also require
basic machine training.
Technical knowledge will most certainly be needed when journals,
357

ledgers, and other internal records give way to invisibly coded tapes
or memory devices within a machine. We must develop new auditing
techniques if we are to keep pace with the new processing techniques.
CONCLUSION
Many traditional auditing procedures will not be changed by the
introduction of electronic data-processing machines. Most of our procedures will continue to be performed independently of machine operations, by verifying processing results through reference to source
document or by other customary practices. However, some auditing
techniques will change, and some of them may change drastically.
Audit trails and control requirements are just as essential under
electronic data processing as they are under any other system.
Efficiency of data processing is a desirable goal; but this goal must not
be realized at a sacrifice of necessary controls and auditability.
The internal auditor, in many instances, will be the logical person
to appraise the control and auditing aspects of electronic machine applications. To do this he must first prepare himself. Preparation will
require considerable effort, but it need not be viewed as a Herculean
project. Most of the mysteries associated with the gigantic machines
will be dispelled in the first programming course.
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